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*The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
             NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-3597
DAPHNE PEREZ,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY  
_________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of New Jersey
                                  District Judge:  The Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
(D.C. No. 02-cv-01282)
_________________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
on March 25, 2004
Before:  FUENTES, SMITH, and
JOHN R. GIBSON,* Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 19, 2004)
______________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
2Daphne Perez appeals from the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the
Commissioner of Social Security in Perez’s suit to establish her entitlement to Disabled
Widow’s Benefits and Supplemental Security Income.  The only point in dispute is
whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the administrative law
judge (known as the ALJ) that Perez retained the residual capacity to perform her past
work of child-care worker.  We affirm the judgment of the district court.
We have jurisdiction to review this case under 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g) (2000) and 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). We, like the district court, review the ALJ’s findings of fact under
the substantial evidence standard.  Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). 
We shall therefore affirm if the ALJ’s findings are supported by such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.  Id. 
The ALJ analyzed Perez’s disability claims using the familiar five-step sequence
prescribed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920 (2001).  The claimant bears the burden
of persuasion through the first four steps of the sequence, and only if the analysis
proceeds to the fifth step does the burden shift to the Commissioner.  Burns, 312 F.3d at
119.  The ALJ found at steps one through three that Perez has not worked since 1992, that
she has a severe impairment involving herniated discs in her neck and lower back, and
that her condition does not meet or equal the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P
to 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404.  The ALJ determined at step four that Perez retained the residual
capacity to perform light work, including lifting and carrying objects weighing up to
3twenty pounds, frequently lifting objects weighing up to ten pounds, and standing,
walking, and sitting up to six hours in an eight-hour day.  The ALJ found that Perez had
past relevant work as a child-care worker (also referred to as nursery school attendant)
and that this job fit within the category of light exertional level.  The ALJ accordingly
found Perez retained the ability to do her past work and she was not disabled. 
Perez contends that the job of child care worker exceeds the light exertional level
because in her past work she was required to lift weights of up to fifty pounds.  She
testified at the hearing that she was required to lift more than twenty pounds and she
stated in a vocational report that she was required to lift up to fifty pounds.  However, she
stated in her disability report that the heaviest weight she lifted at the job was twenty
pounds.  As finder of fact, the ALJ was entitled to choose between Perez’s own accounts. 
Moreover, the ALJ was entitled to consider whether Perez could perform the job as it is
customarily performed in the national economy, Social Security Ruling 82-61 and 82-62,
and to take into account the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th
ed. 1991). The description of nursery school attendant in the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles § 359.677-018 categorizes this job in the light exertional level.  The ALJ’s
determination that Perez could perform the job was supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
   _______________
